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Abstract
Objective To assess the cost effectiveness of screening, isolation, and
decolonisation strategies in the control of meticillin resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in intensive care units.
Design Economic evaluation based on a dynamic transmission model.
Setting England and Wales.
Population Theoretical population of patients on an intensive care unit.
Main outcome measures Infections, deaths, costs, quality adjusted life
years (QALYs), incremental cost effectiveness ratios for alternative
strategies, and net monetary benefits.
Results All decolonisation strategies improved health outcomes and
reduced costs. Although universal decolonisation (regardless of MRSA
status) was the most cost effective in the short term, strategies using
screening to target MRSA carriers may be preferred owing to the reduced
risk of selecting for resistance. Among such targeted strategies, universal
admission and weekly screening with polymerase chain reaction coupled
with decolonisation using nasal mupirocin was the most cost effective.
This finding was robust to the size of intensive care units, prevalence of
MRSA on admission, proportion of patients classified as high risk, and
precise value of willingness to pay for health benefits. All strategies using
isolation but not decolonisation improved health outcomes but costs
were increased. When the prevalence of MRSA on admission to the
intensive care unit was 5% and the willingness to pay per QALY gained
was between £20 000 (€23 000; $32 000) and £30 000, the best such
strategy was to isolate only those patients at high risk of carrying MRSA
(either pre-emptively or after identification by admission and weekly
screening for MRSA using chromogenic agar). Universal admission and
weekly screening using polymerase chain reaction based detection of
MRSA coupled with isolation was unlikely to be cost effective unless
prevalence was high (10% of patients colonised with MRSA on
admission).
Conclusions MRSA control strategies that use decolonisation are likely
to be cost saving in an intensive care unit setting provided resistance is
lacking, and combining universal screening using polymerase chain
reaction with decolonisation is likely to represent good value for money
if untargeted decolonisation is considered unacceptable. In intensive
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Research
RESEARCHcare units where decolonisation is not implemented, evidence is
insufficient to support universal screening for MRSA outside high
prevalence settings.
Introduction
Despite the recent decline in incidence of meticillin resistant
Staphylococcusaureus(MRSA)inseveralEuropeancountries,
infection remains a major cause of avoidable morbidity and
mortality in patients admitted to hospital, particularly those in
intensive care units. MRSA infection increases the length of
hospital stay, risk of death, and treatment costs. Patients may
also become colonised with MRSA but remain asymptomatic.
Such colonisation increases the risk of developing a clinical
MRSA infection and is a source of cross infection.
Isolation and decolonisation are the two main targeted control
measures for reducing the transmission of MRSA. Isolation
interrupts cross infection through physical or behavioural
barriers such as disposable gloves and aprons (contact
precautions) or the placement of patients in isolation wards,
single rooms, or cohort groups, with or without nursing staff
designated for the exclusive care of MRSA infected patients.
Decolonisation attempts to eliminate or suppress MRSA using
topical antimicrobials such as chlorhexidine and intranasal
mupirocin,therebyreducingthebacterialloadavailabletocause
endogenous infection and transmission to other patients.
Isolationanddecolonisationareoftencombinedwithscreening
to detect colonised patients. Early and accurate detection of
colonised or infected patients allows timely implementation of
interventions aimed at preventing transmission or infection.
Many screening options exist, each with different performance
characteristics: conventional culture, which is cheap but takes
three or more days to give a result; chromogenic agars, which
provide a result in one or two days; and polymerase chain
reaction tests, which can give a result in a few hours and may
bemoresensitivebutalsomoreexpensivethantheotheroptions.
Which patients to screen and when also varies across settings:
some screen all patients on admission and at regular intervals
thereafter; some target screening to patients considered to be at
high risk of carriage; and some do not screen at all.
Only a few of the many possible combinations of interventions
have been examined in clinical trials,
1-4 and economic evidence
available to policy makers is scant. Consequently, control
strategies vary from hospital to hospital. We evaluated the
effectiveness and cost effectiveness of different combinations
of screening, isolation, and decolonisation in intensive care
units, where the consequences of MRSA acquisition are often
greatest.
Methods
We developed a dynamic, stochastic, individual based model
of MRSA transmission in an intensive care unit (fig 1⇓),
simulatingthemovementofpatients,transmissionprocess,and
control interventions as well as associated patient outcomes
(numbers of infections, discharges, and deaths). See web extra
appendix 1 for further details.
Interventions and screening scenarios
We evaluated three screening technologies for MRSA:
conventional culture, chromogenic agar, and polymerase chain
reaction. Chromogenic agar yields results in 24 and 48 hours.
Both times were considered, such that interventions based on
aresultat24hourscouldbeamendedaftertheresultat48hours.
For each technology we assessed three options for screening
intensity: no screening (clinical cultures only), screening all
patientsonadmissionandweeklythereafter,andadmissionand
weekly screening of patients considered to be at high risk of
carrying MRSA. In all strategies we assumed clinical cultures
were taken using the same technology as for screening (and
conventional culture in the baseline strategy). Each of the
screening strategies was combined with either isolation or
decolonisation (table 1⇓). In total we evaluated 12 strategies
for screening plus isolation and nine for screening plus
decolonisation.Inbothcasestheseincludedstrategiesapplying
interventionstopatientsidentifiedaspositiveforMRSAthrough
screening (or clinical specimens) in the intensive care unit and
strategies applying interventions to all or all high risk intensive
care unit admissions.
We considered isolation to be the application of contact
precautions rather than physical separation, so capacity was
unlimited. Isolation continued until three consecutive negative
results from swabs were obtained. Decolonisation used nasal
mupirocinadministeredthreetimesdaily(forstrategiestargeting
MRSA carriers) or daily patient washings with chlorhexidine
for five days (for strategies involving universal use).
Weevaluatedeachstrategyunderbaselinevaluesforparameters
(table 2⇓), low and high prevalence settings (2% and 10% of
patientscolonisedonadmission),smallandlargeintensivecare
units (five and 20 beds), and with 36% (rather than 18%) of
patients classified as high risk.
Model parameters
Toaccountforuncertaintyinthemodelparameters,weassigned
probability distributions to each when appropriate (table 2).
Theseprobabilitydistributionswerederivedfromprimarypeer
reviewedresearcharticleswherepossibleandfromnewanalyses
of primary data otherwise (see web extra table A2.1 and
appendix2).Neitherapproachwaspossibleforsomeparameters
concerning the impact of decolonisation treatment on
transmission. Instead we considered two scenarios: a
conservativebaselineassumptionthatdecolonisationtreatment
(with mupirocin) had no transmission blocking effect, and a
“best guess” based on expert opinion (see web extra appendix
2).
33
Cost effectiveness evaluation
Estimated costs included direct costs of the intervention,
infection related treatment costs, and extra bed days and their
associated opportunity costs (see web extra appendix 2).
Health benefits were reduced morbidity (during an episode on
the intensive care unit) and reduced mortality owing to avoided
infections,
34 summarised by changes in quality adjusted life
years (QALYs).
35 36 From data on survival rates and preference
based utility scores we estimated QALYs that accrued after
hospital discharge (see web extra appendix 2).
37
We used a time dependent model to estimate the additional
length of stay and mortality attributable to MRSA infections,
giving unadjusted daily discharge and death probabilities for
patients with and without MRSA infection (see web extra table
A2.2andappendix2).
38Thedailyrelativeriskratiofordischarge
after infection was 0.60 (95% confidence interval 0.53 to 0.68)
and for death after infection was 1.19 (0.97 to 1.43).
The perspective for this analysis is that of a decision maker in
healthcare who manages resources at a regional or national
level.Weaimedtorepresentthepreferencesofhighlevelpolicy
makers who seek to improve the economic efficiency of
healthcare services. A shortcoming of this approach is that,
unlikeanalysesfromawidersocietalperspective,costsincurred
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However, recent studies show that these costs are likely to be
small compared with hospital costs
39 40 and are unlikely to
change the conclusions from models.
We calculated the incremental cost effectiveness ratios,
representing the cost per QALY gained on changing to an
alternative intervention strategy (compared with the existing
baseline strategy). Strategies were considered cost effective if
they generated an incremental cost effectiveness ratio less than
the usual National Health Service maximum willingness to pay
of £30 000 (€34 000; $48 000) per QALY.
41 We calculated
incremental cost effectiveness ratios using baseline values for
parameters (see web extra appendix 3 for scenario analyses).
Wealsocalculatednetmonetarybenefits,definedasΔE×λ−ΔC,
where λ is the willingness to pay per QALY gained, and ΔE
andΔCare,respectively,changesinQALYsandcostscompared
with the baseline strategy.
42 Probabilistic sensitivity analyses
(accounting for uncertainty in all parameters) were carried out
andusedtocalculatetheexpectednetmonetarybenefitforeach
intervention (see web extra appendix 2).
Results
Screening in combination with decolonisation
All decolonisation strategies improved health outcomes and
reduced costs (see web extra appendix 3, fig A3.1). This was
because decolonisation, unlike isolation alone, can reduce the
risk of infection in MRSA carriers. Universal decolonisation
using chlorhexidine had a far higher probability of being cost
effective than any other strategy (fig 2⇓). At the willingness to
pay threshold of £30 000 per QALY, universal decolonisation
using chlorhexidine had about a 70% chance of being the most
cost effective strategy. The next best strategy—screening of all
patients using polymerase chain reaction combined with
mupirocintreatmentofpatientspositiveforMRSA—hadabout
a 30% probability of being cost effective. Universal
decolonisation using chlorhexidine also provided the highest
expected net monetary benefit at a willingness to pay of £30
000perQALY(fig2).Pre-emptivedecolonisationofallpatients
remained the most cost effective option in sensitivity analyses
of varying intensive care unit size, prevalence of MRSA on
admission, and proportion of high risk patients admitted (see
web extra appendix 3).
Suchblanketuseofdecolonisationagentsmay,however,hasten
the emergence of resistance. Assuming that universal
decolonisation using chlorhexidine is not a viable option, then
the strategy of screening all patients using polymerase chain
reaction and decolonising those identified as MRSA positive
provides the highest expected net monetary benefit at all
willingness to pay values over £5000 per QALY (fig 2). This
result was not affected by the size of the intensive care unit,
prevalence of MRSA on admission, or size of the high risk
group (see web extra appendix 3). Results were also largely
insensitive to assumptions about the effectiveness of
decolonisation (see web extra appendix 3). However, if
mupirocinwasassumedtobecompletelyineffectiveatclearing
MRSA carriage (although still able to suppress the risk of
transmission and endogenous infection during treatment) then,
after excluding universal decolonisation using chlorhexidine,
screening all patients using polymerase chain reaction and
decolonising those infected was fractionally over the usual cost
effectiveness threshold, at £30 865 per QALY gained (see web
extra appendix 3).
Screening in combination with isolation of
patients
Isolating only clinically identified cases resulted in the most
unisolated bed days while MRSA positive (fig 3⇓). Universal
pre-emptiveisolationminimisedthenumberofunisolateddays
while MRSA positive but maximised inappropriate isolation
(theisolationofMRSAnegativepatients).Limitingpre-emptive
isolationtohighriskpatientsdecreasedinappropriateisolation,
but approximately halved appropriate isolation compared with
universalpre-emptiveisolation.Couplingpre-emptiveisolation
of high risk patients with subsequent amendment of isolation
status based on the results of universal screening using
conventional culture increased appropriate isolation and
approximately halved the number of unisolated bed days while
MRSA positive compared with limiting pre-emptive isolation
to high risk patients. Among the different screening
methodologies, screening using polymerase chain reaction led
to the highest appropriate use of isolation. Targeting screening
tohighriskpatientsonlyslightlyreducedappropriateisolation.
Strategies that rapidly isolate MRSA infected
patients—universalpre-emptiveisolationandisolationofMRSA
positivepatientsidentifiedusingpolymerasechainreaction—led
to the greatest reduction in MRSA transmission and infection
(fig 4⇓), although differences in numbers of MRSA related
infections and deaths were small (fig 4). However, even small
differences in mortality can represent good value for money if
the intervention cost is low.
Althoughallinterventionstrategiesledtohealthgainscompared
with the strategy of doing nothing, in all cases the costs also
increased (see web extra appendix 3, fig A3.2). Choosing
between competing strategies requires consideration of cost
effectiveness acceptability curves and the cost effectiveness
acceptability frontier. Cost effectiveness acceptability curves
show the probability of cost effectiveness dependent on the
willingness to pay for health benefits. These revealed
considerable uncertainty in the optimal screening and isolation
strategy when the willingness to pay was within the usual NHS
rangeof£20000to£30000(fig5⇓).Nostrategyhadmorethan
a 20% chance of being optimal.
Although cost effectiveness acceptability curves are valuable
forrepresentingthedegreeofuncertaintyinanoptimalstrategy,
theycontaininsufficientinformationforgooddecisionmaking;
identifying the strategy with the highest expected net monetary
benefit is more useful.
43 This is illustrated on the cost
effectiveness acceptability frontier (fig 5), which shows the
probability that the strategy with the highest expected net
monetary benefit is cost effective for a given willingness to pay
for health outcomes.
The cost effectiveness acceptability frontier representing
screening and isolation strategies was split into five sections
(fig 5). For a willingness to pay of up to about £17 000 per
QALY the approach to do nothing was favoured. Within the
usual NHS willingness to pay range of £20 000 to £30 000 the
greatest net monetary benefit would be provided by either a
strategy of no screening but simply pre-emptive isolation of
highriskpatientsorastrategyusingchromogenicagartoscreen
high risk patients and subsequent isolation of those identified
as MRSA positive. Screening all admissions using polymerase
chain reaction became the optimum strategy only once the
willingness to pay reached almost £100 000 per QALY gained
(over three times the usual NHS threshold).
At baseline values for parameters, a strategy of screening high
risk patients with chromogenic agar (using both early and late
results) was optimal. This remained true for smaller and larger
No commercial reuse: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2011;343:d5694 doi: 10.1136/bmj.d5694 Page 3 of 13
RESEARCHintensivecareunitsandahigherproportionofhighriskpatients.
For a low prevalence setting (2% of patients colonised with
MRSA on admission) screening high risk patients using
chromogenic agar remained cost effective, but in a high
prevalence setting (10% colonised with MRSA on admission)
screening all patients using polymerase chain reaction became
cost effective (see web extra appendix 3).
Discussion
Although a model based analysis indicated that a strategy of
universal topical decolonisation, regardless of MRSA status,
was optimal in the short term, such untargeted use may select
for resistance, making such strategies unsustainable in the long
term.
44 45 For this reason, restricting the use of topical agents to
patients known to be positive for MRSA may be preferred.
Excludingpre-emptivedecolonisationofallpatients,theoptimal
strategy was targeted decolonisation based on the outcomes of
universaladmissionandweeklyscreensusingpolymerasechain
reaction. The next best strategy was admission and weekly
screening of all patients using chromogenic agar with
decolonisation of those found to be MRSA positive (fig 2),
although this had a much lower probability (compared with
polymerasechainreaction)ofbeingoptimalata5%prevalence
on admission.
Where decolonisation strategies are not used, admission and
weekly screening coupled with isolation using contact
precautionspotentiallyreducesMRSAtransmission,infections,
and deaths. Use of polymerase chain reaction in this case,
however,ledtoonlymodestreductionsinMRSAinfectionrates
comparedwithculture.Thisisaconsequenceofasmallnumber
of patients with unusually long lengths of stay accounting for
a disproportionate number of MRSA related bed days.
38
Although screening using polymerase chain reaction reduces
the number of unisolated bed days while MRSA positive
compared with culture, the percentage reduction will be small
for patients with long stays.
Amongstrategieswithoutdecolonisation,universalpolymerase
chainreactionscreeningwasunlikelytobecosteffectivewithin
the usual NHS range of £20 000 to £30 000 per QALY gained,
withchromogenicagarbasedscreeningandstrategiestargeting
highriskpatientsbeingfavoured.Thisreflectsthelackofeffect
on progression from colonisation with MRSA to infection, and
large uncertainty about the effect of contact precautions in
reducing transmission, with a possibility that such precautions
increase transmission.
30 This could plausibly occur as a result
of poorer compliance with hand hygiene associated with glove
use.
46
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
Strengths of the modelling approach adopted here include the
use of a dynamic transmission model to take into account that
preventing MRSA acquisition in one patient benefits both that
patient and other patients through reduced risk of cross
infection.
47-49 Such knock-on effects are important in high
transmission settings such as intensive care units, and static
decision analytical models would fail to take these effects into
account.
50-52Accuratemodellingofthelengthofstaydistribution
is also critical for assessing the benefits of rapid screening, as
isaccuratelyquantifyingadditionallengthofstayandmortality
attributabletoMRSAinfections.
38Thesearelikelytohavebeen
substantially over-estimated in the past by models that ignore
the dynamic nature of infection.
53 Additionally, quantifying
what is often substantial uncertainty in parameter values and
accounting for it in strategy evaluations represents a more
rational approach than one based only on point estimates for
parameter values.
Limitations relate to simplifying assumptions and
generalisability. Because the model ignores infections after
dischargeandbecausecolonisationwithMRSAmayhavelonger
term health consequences, as well as potentially leading to
readmissions of colonised patients, the results presented are
expected to underestimate health benefits and cost savings
resulting from interventions to control MRSA.
For targeted strategies we used a decolonisation regimen of
mupirocin alone, whereas many protocols may use skin
antiseptics concurrently. As the best available evidence on
effectiveness was for mupirocin alone, however, we used these
to inform our model. Our estimates of the effectiveness of
decolonisation are therefore likely to be conservative.
Pre-emptive universal decolonisation with agents such as
chlorhexidinemayreduceotherhealthcareassociatedinfections,
particularly catheter related ones, the benefit of which was not
incorporated into our models.
54-57 Conversely, decolonisation
using nasal mupirocin has been reported to be associated with
an increase of infections caused by other micro-organisms,
although it remains unclear whether the link is causal.
32
Therefore, with the possible exception of mupirocin based
decolonisation interventions, cost effectiveness estimates
reported here are likely to be conservative: true net monetary
benefits are likely to be somewhat higher than those we report.
Anotherassumptionislackofresistancetotopicalantimicrobial
agentsusedfordecontaminationofcolonisedpatients.Thiswill
not be the case for all settings; mupirocin resistance is not
uncommonandtherehasbeenarecentreportofanMRSAstrain
with a reduced susceptibility to chlorhexidine,
44 the clinical
relevance of which is still open to debate.
58 59 In view of this, in
all evaluations of decolonisation regimens we have carried out
asecondaryanalysisexcludinguniversaluseofdecolonisation.
Comparison with other studies
A Health Technology Assessment of the cost effectiveness of
MRSA screening in Scotland concluded that screening of all
admissions to hospital using chromogenic agar with isolation
of those identified as potential carriers proved most effective at
reducing prevalence and most cost effective compared with no
screening, and screening according to risk (of unit) and clinical
riskassessment,regardlessofwhethersuchscreeningusedagar,
chromogenic agar, or polymerase chain reaction.
60 A further
study
61projectedthatuniversalscreeningforMRSAcouldresult
inanimportantreductioninMRSAratesoverthreetofiveyears,
andwhilechromogenicagarandpolymerasechainreactionhad
acomparableeffect,polymerasechainreactionwasmorecostly.
Our study differed in that we limited the focus to intensive care
units and we evaluated a wide range of intervention policies
accounting for parameter uncertainty. We combined available
evidence to determine distributions for parameters describing
the effectiveness of interventions.
Implications and future research
Since 2006 the emphasis on the prevention and control of
healthcare associated infections, particularly MRSA, has
increased and this research sits in a context of wide ranging
national guidance on infection control.
62 63 Although infection
prevention methods of patient isolation and decolonisation (or
suppression)arerecommended,decisionsremainlocallydriven
and dependent on risk analysis. As a result, practices vary
substantially between NHS trusts. While universal MRSA
screening has been mandatory in England and Wales since
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costeffectivenessofthisandaccompanyinginterventions.This
study highlights the importance of evaluating the cost
effectiveness of recommended prevention strategies and is
especiallyimportantinsupportingappropriatedecisionmaking
during a period of cost restraint.
Our research found that even with conservative assumptions
for the benefits of interventions, decolonisation strategies were
highly likely to be cost effective in an intensive care unit setting
and that, when combined with decolonisation, universal
screening was likely to be a cost effective option. However, we
highlight the need to be vigilant for the development of
resistance to agents used for decolonisation. In contrast, we
found no evidence to support universal screening (with any
technology) as a cost effective intervention when accompanied
by isolation. This reflects the lack of evidence on the
effectiveness of contact precautions in substantially reducing
transmission. Given this uncertainty, we found that isolation
andscreeningstrategiestargetedtohighriskpatientswerelikely
to be a more efficient use of resources.
The need for clinical investigations into the effectiveness of
interventions has been further highlighted through this
research.
61 64 The large extent of uncertainty about parameters
reflectsthescarcityofhighqualityresearch,andsomeimportant
model parameters can only be estimated using single studies.
Methodologically rigorous assessments from randomised trials
of the effectiveness of interventions in reducing MRSA
transmission and infections are rare. Considering a recent
study,
65wherelargereductions(62%)inMRSAinfectionswere
achieved using universal screening without accompanying
decolonisation(amongotherinterventions),rigorousevaluation
of isolation should be a priority. Such studies would be of great
value in helping to make better decisions about intervention
policies.
Futureworkshouldalsoextendthemodeltodescribelongterm
patternsofpatients’movements(betweenandwithinthehospital
and community) and to account for the spread of resistance to
topicalantimicrobialagents.AnincreaseinresistanceinMRSA
strains has the potential to greatly reduce the efficacy of
decolonisation and therefore may severely compromise these
strategies. Understanding the longer term consequences of
widespread decolonisation, whether pre-emptive or targeted,
and devising strategies to minimise the risks of emerging
resistance should be a priority.
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RESEARCHTables
Table 1| Combinations of screening and interventions for the control of meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in patients on
intensive care units
Intervention
Screening method Screening Procedure Timing Patient group*
Isolation or decolonisation
(chlorhexidine)
On result MRSA positive Conventional culture of clinical
swabs only
No screening
Isolation or decolonisation
(chlorhexidine)
Pre-emptively All patients Conventional culture of clinical
swabs only
No screening
Isolation or decolonisation
(chlorhexidine)
Pre-emptively High risk patients Conventional culture of clinical
swabs only
No screening
Isolation† Pre-emptively (amended on
screen result)
High risk patients Conventional culture All patients
Isolation or decolonisation (mupirocin) On result MRSA positive Conventional culture All patients on
admission, and
weekly thereafter
Isolation or decolonisation (mupirocin) On 48 hour result MRSA positive Chromogenic agar
Isolation† On 24 hour result (amended on
48 hour result)
MRSA positive
Isolation or decolonisation (mupirocin) On result MRSA positive Polymerase chain reaction
Isolation or decolonisation (mupirocin) On result MRSA positive Conventional culture High risk patients on
admission, and
weekly thereafter
Isolation or decolonisation (mupirocin) On 48 hour result MRSA positive Chromogenic agar
Isolation† On 24 hour result (amended on
48 hour result)
MRSA positive
Isolation or decolonisation (mupirocin) On result MRSA positive Polymerase chain reaction
In all strategies, if MRSA was recovered from a clinical specimen the patient was isolated or decolonised according to the specified intervention.
*MRSA positive patients are believed to be colonised or infected with MRSA based on clinical or screening swab result.
†Decolonisation not applicable.
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RESEARCHTable 2| Values and sources of parameters. Values are means (standard deviations) or [values for sensitivity analyses] unless stated
otherwise
Sources Values Parameters
Population
1, 5-9 0.05 [0.02 and 0.10] Prevalence of MRSA on admission
10, 11 2.4×prevalence of MRSA on admission Prevalence of MRSA in high risk patients on admission
10, 11 0.18 [0.36] Proportion of high risk patients
ICNARC 10 [5 and 20] No of intensive care unit beds
Transmission
Analysis of individual data (see web extra
appendix 2)
0.0037 (0.00043) Daily probability of cross colonisation per source*
0.0006 (0.00023) Daily probability of cross infection per source*
0.047 (0.0094) Daily probability of progression from colonisation to infection*
Screening
Conventional culture†:
12-14 68.15 (19.39) Sensitivity (%)‡
88.23 (6.33) Specificity (%)‡
15-17 4 Turnaround time (days)§
Chromogenic agar (48 hour result):
18-22 82.55 (4.27) Sensitivity (%)‡
83.05 (17.72) Specificity (%)‡
15, 17, 18, 20 3 Turnaround time (days)§
Chromogenic agar (24 hour result):
13, 18, 20-22 62.17 (12.49) Sensitivity (%)*
97.13 (4.17) Specificity (%)*
17 2 Turnaround time (days)§
Polymerase chain reaction:
16, 19, 22-29 88.40 (5.10) Sensitivity (%)‡
83.8 (4.74) Specificity (%)‡
16, 17, 19, 24, 26 1 Turnaround time (days)§
Isolation
30 36.5 (62.2) Transmissibility of patient undergoing isolation precautions (% reduction)
Decolonisation
31 [assumptions] 53 [0 and 100] Treated patients who reverted to MRSA negative state (%)
Effect on susceptibility to colonisation (% reduction):
Analysis of individual data 65 (7) Bodywash (chlorhexidine)
Assumption [¶] 0 [33] Topical therapy (mupirocin)
Effect on susceptibility to infection (% reduction):
Analysis of individual data 66 (21) Bodywash (chlorhexidine)
Assumption [¶] 0 [10] Topical therapy (mupirocin)
Effect on transmissibility of infectious patient (% reduction):
Assumption [¶] 0 [12.5] Topical therapy (mupirocin)
% reduction in probability of progression or self infection:
Analysis of individual data 31 (18) Bodywash (chlorhexidine)
32 [¶] 33 (12) [47] Topical therapy (mupirocin)
ICNARC=Intensive Care National Audit and Research Centre.
For sensitivity analysis all values expressed as percentages are assumed to follow normal distributions, truncated at 100%.
*Probability of transmission from single MRSA source to single susceptible patient on same ward.
†Medium containing mannitol, salt, and oxacillin.
‡Arithmetic mean (standard deviation) from listed source.
§Means of reported laboratory processing times, adjusted to account for ward delays as estimated in Harbarth et al 2006.
17
¶Estimates obtained from formal elicitation of expert opinion (see web extra appendix 2 for methods).
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RESEARCHFigures
Fig 1 Model schematic showing possible movements of patients (dotted arrows) and transitions between states (solid
arrows). MRSA=meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus
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RESEARCHFig 2 Cost effectiveness acceptability curves and frontiers for screening and decolonisation strategies. Each line on cost
effectiveness acceptability curve represents the proportion of simulations for a particular strategy that are cost effective,
under a range of values for willingness to pay for health benefits. Lines in cost effectiveness acceptability frontiers depict
scenarios with highest expected net monetary benefit, dependent on willingness to pay for health benefits. The first frontier
compares all strategies; the second excludes universal decolonisation
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RESEARCHFig 3 Use of isolation under each screening and isolation strategy, showing appropriate isolation (isolation of MRSA positive
patients), inappropriate isolation (isolation of MRSA negative patients), and bed days spent unisolated while MRSA positive
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RESEARCHFig 4 Patient outcomes under each screening and isolation strategy, showing new acquisitions (transmissions) of MRSA
by patients in an intensive care unit, total number of MRSA infections in an intensive care unit, and total number of deaths
(all per 100 admissions)
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RESEARCHFig 5 Cost effectiveness acceptability curves and frontier for screening and isolation strategies. Lines in cost effectiveness
acceptability frontier depict strategies with highest expected net monetary benefit dependent on willingness to pay for health
benefits
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